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BOOK REVIEWS 
God, Time and Eternity, by William Lane Craig. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2001. Pp. xi, 321. $105.00 (cloth). 
GEOFFREY GORHAM, Macalester College 
In the preface to this wide-ranging and impressive study, William Lane 
Craig wonders whether the many other recent works on God's relation to 
time have left him with anything to say (x). Evidently undaunted, he pro-
ceeds over the course of 284 pages to examine the issue from a variety of 
perspectives, including biblical interpretation, the tensed and tenseless the-
ories of time, the special and general theories of relativity, and contempo-
rary cosmology. And in each of these areas he succeeds in finding some-
thing very interesting to say. Craig offers, along with incisive critical analy-
sis covering much of the large body of recent philosophical literature, a sci-
entifically informed defense of his own 'Ockhamist' conception of God's 
temporal status. This view is that God has been temporal since the creation 
of time and the universe at the Big Bang, but is atemporal sans (one mustn't 
say 'before') creation. Since creation, God's time is (or coincides with) the 
'cosmic time' of the expanding universe, while sans creation God exists in a 
solitary, timeless, and changeless (but not immutable) state. 
The book has two parts. Part I ('The Nature of Divine Eternity') is a critical 
survey of arguments for and against the timelessness of God. In the first 
chapter, after quickly finding the biblical evidence inconclusive, Craig care-
fully dissects the sixteen philosophical arguments for timelessness articulat-
ed in Brian Leftow's Time and Eternity. All but one of them he judges to be 
unsound. While there is much in this long chapter that will be of use to the 
divine temporalist, those with no current stake in the debate might occasion-
ally wonder where it is all leading, since Craig's own theory is not made 
fully explicit until much later in the book. The (not unpleasant) feeling is as 
of having stumbled upon a second-hand copy of Leftow's book with exten-
sive marginalia by an exceptionally perceptive reader. One problematic 
assumption that seems to infect several of Leftow's arguments is that if God 
is temporal then he is necessarily temporal. This assumption would imply 
that a temporal God is not necessary given time is not necessary. Craig 
argues convincingly that one could reject the assumption, since even if God 
is temporal he could have freely chosen not to make time and the universe 
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(pp. 14-5). Or one could reject the premise that the existence of time is contin-
gent, as Newton apparently did (p. 19). Another assumption frequently 
invoked by Leftow against divine temporality is that according to the four-
dimensionalism of modem physics whatever is at a time is also at a place. 
Craig holds that this argument depends on a reductionist conflation of 
'physical time' and 'metaphysical time' (a distinction I will return to below). 
One important issue that runs through several of the arguments is whether a 
temporal God could continuously create time. Leftow suggests that there 
seems to be an explanatory circle in supposing a temporal God creates t at t. 
For the act of creation at t already presupposes that God exists at t. Craig 
replies that at least on a relational theory any time t is actually 'logically pos-
terior' to some event, such as God's action (p. 21). The one argument against 
divine temporality that Craig finds promising (though not decisive) is that a 
temporal being necessarily suffers the misfortune of not enjoying all of its life 
at once. One could perhaps adopt the Roycean view that God's specious pre-
sent covers all of time but, as Craig observes, this solution seems to have the 
unhappy consequence that God could not experience his specious present 
until he had endured to the end of time (p. 36). 
The next three chapters take up three familiar arguments for divine 
temporality: only a temporal God is a person (Ch. 2); only a temporal 
God could act in the world (Ch. 3); only a temporal God could know 
tensed facts, such as what time it is now (Ch. 4). Craig rejects the first 
argument on the grounds that a timeless being could be conscious (of 
eternal facts), rational (in the sense of not violating any epistemic 
duties), and have volitions (to possess his eternal goods). On the other 
hand, Craig grants that a timeless God would not have future-directed 
intentions, or the pleasures of learning or anticipation. Nor would he, 
qua timeless and changeless, be capable of interacting with human per-
sons. For Craig, this merely points to the value of the Ockhamist idea 
that God exists timelessly sans creation but enters into relations with 
temporal events and human persons at the instant of creation (p. 53). 
The argument that God could not act in the world without being in time 
is sound, according to Craig, but only assuming the world's time is 
tensed. If the tenseless theory of time is true, then he thinks there is no 
problem about a timeless God acting in the temporal realm (pp. 108-9). 
Here Craig raises a number of very strong objections against atemporal-
ist efforts to handle the problem, such as the traditional Thomistic idea 
that God does not stand in a real relation to creation, and the Stump-
Kretzmann model of "ET-simultaneity./I But his reasons for thinking the 
same problem is avoided on a tenseless theory of time are open to ques-
tion. If the problem is that God's actions in the world acquire temporal 
locations, then that will be so even if times have dates but not tenses. If 
the problem is that God's interaction with the temporal world necessari-
ly implies a (relational) change in God, then that will be so even if the 
change is only the bringing about of different effects at different dates 
rather than the bringing about of different effects at different nows. The 
last of the three arguments for divine temporality is that an atemporal 
God could not know what time it is now (or was or will be). Craig offers 
detailed and trenchant criticisms of recent attempts to reconcile divine 
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atemporality and omniscience. Less compelling is his response to those 
who urge that omniscience must not be expected of a perfect being. 
Leftow, for example, points out that God could not know what it is like 
to be a failure oneself, just as a human being could not know what it is 
like to be a bat. Craig's reply, that these cases do not involve ignorance 
of propositions, is beside the point, unless one is prepared to deny that 
humans would really learn something by becoming aware of batty expe-
rience. Nevertheless, Craig is surely right that even if God's perfection 
prevents him from knowing such things as first-personal failure, it 
should not prevent him from knowing what time it is now (p. 130). He is 
also obviously right that this problem does not arise for the atemporalist 
if the world's time is tense less. In this respect, the tenseless theory of 
time seems to offer "a way out for defenders of divine timelessness" (p. 
132). Alas, according to Craig the way out is really a dead end since the 
tenseless theory is false. (For details, Craig refers the reader to two com-
panion volumes: The Tensed Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (2000) 
and The Tense/ess Theory of Time: A Critical Examination (2000).) 
In Part II ('God and Time') Craig undertakes the large task of recon-
ciling divine temporality, the tensed theory of time, and modern 
physics. He begins with an interesting historical excursus on the theolog-
ical underpinnings of Newton's conceptions of absolute space and time. 
Drawing upon recent scholarship (especially by 1. B. Cohen and J. E. 
McGuire) which reveals that God's relation to the physical world was an 
important concern throughout Newton's life, and not just in his dotage, 
Craig concludes that the "classical, Newtonian conception of time is 
rooted in a theistic metaphysic" (p. 157). But this conclusion seems to be 
stronger than the scholarly evidence warrants. It is one thing to 
acknowledge Newton's own conviction in the famous General Scholium 
that to discourse of God from the appearances of things "does certainly 
belong to natural philosophy." But it is quite another thing to say that 
the concept of time in his physics is "rooted" in his theism. After all, the 
General Scholium discussing God and the world does not even appear 
in the first edition of the Principia but only in the much later second edi-
tion. Granted Newton was not a twentieth century positivist, neither 
was he a thirteenth century scholastic. 
Einstein's epistemology, on the other hand, was certainly broadly 
positivistic, at least around the time of the Special Theory of Relativity 
(STR). And Craig argues that only excessive verificationism requires the 
standard Einsteinian interpretation of STR, which prohibits absolute 
simultaneity and any privileged frame of reference. He points out that 
Lorentz early provided an interpretation of STR which, although empiri-
cally equivalent to Einstein's model, retains a privileged frame of refer-
ence in the form of a physically undetectable ether. Craig's provocative 
and informed defense of Neo-Lorentzian models of relativity is valuable, 
even apart from questions about theism. (Those interested may wish to 
consult yet another recent volume by Craig: Time and the Metaphysics of 
Relativity (2001).) Yet one must emphasize that if the Einsteinian and 
Neo-Lorentzian models are really empirically equivalent, then 
Ockham's razor should eliminate the latter for positing an empirically 
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superfluous spacetime structure. On this point, Craig suggests that such 
methodological constraints "can be overridden by considerations broad-
er than the laws of motion" (p. 189). Perhaps so; but Craig spends pre-
cious little time on the important methodological question of when 
metaphysical or theological considerations can "override" empirical 
ones. Since he frequently uses the label "verificationist" as a club, Craig 
owes the reader a more detailed explanation and defense of his own 
methodological assumptions. 
Craig finds in the General Theory of Relativity (GTR) a physical can-
didate for the privileged frame whose planes of simultaneity would con-
stitute the "moving now" of a temporal God. This is "cosmic time": the 
measure of the rate of expansion of the universe as a whole since the Big 
Bang. Of course, there is a problem associating God's time too closely 
with cosmic time since cosmic time depends on empirically contingent 
features of the universe, such as the statistically homogenous distribu-
tion of mass-energy. If such conditions do not obtain then cosmic time 
does not exist, and if they change then cosmic time itself changes. But 
surely God's time would not then not exist or change. Craig insists that 
such worries do not take account of the distinction (which he frequently 
invokes) between God's "metaphysical time" and the universe's "physi-
cal time": metaphysical time and cosmic time are "presently coincident 
though not identical" (p. 242). But it is not clear how there can be two 
coincident times, any more than there can two coincident spaces. Craig 
suggests: "cosmic time and metaphysical time, while radically different 
in that one is physical and the other is not, pick out the same duration 
under different names" (p. 244). But isn't this rather like saying that 
, coriander' and 'cilantro' are radically different even though they pick 
out the same herb under different names? 
The final two chapters return to a problem of traditional theology: 
creation ex nihilo. Craig argues, on biblical and philosophical grounds, 
that the universe and (tensed) time were both created out of nothing in 
the finite past. The philosophical arguments are based on the impossibil-
ity of an actually infinite number of past years and the need to block the 
question why God waited an infinite time before creating the universe. 
If these arguments are successful and time has a beginning, it follows 
that God's life has both an atemporal and a temporal stage. Sans cre-
ation, God exists alone in a timeless, unchanging state. At the first 
instant of creation (the Big Bang) God is simultaneous with, but causally 
prior to, the universe. After that, his time flows along with the expan-
sion of the universe. This model is perhaps hard to grasp, and the meta-
physical and physical arguments by which Craig arrives at it are diffi-
cult and complex. But although I have registered serious reservations, 
the force of Craig's arguments are finally as evident as his broad learn-
ing and philosophical acumen. So it will be impossible for proponents of 
other models to ignore this important contribution to philosophical the-
ology and the philosophy of time. 
